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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  model  conﬂict  between  two agents  in  which  each  one  has  two  possible  strategies:  cease-ﬁre  or
rejection  of  the  truce.  We  use  the  concept  of  pre-donations,  namely,  a redeﬁnition  of  the  game  in which
each agent  commits  to  transfer a  share  of  its output  to  the  other  agent  (Sertel,  1991).  Conditions  are
established  under  which  a system  of  pre-donations  may  facilitate  a  truce.  In  particular,  for  conﬂicts
involving  high  costs  there is  a distributive  mechanism,  acceptable  for  both  parties,  whereby  cease-ﬁre  is
the best  strategy  for  both  of them.  However,  in  many  cases  the  conditions  are  not  right  for such  a scheme  of
pre-donations  to be effective.  Some  limitations  of  the  framework  are analyzed  and  the  model  is  extended
to deal  with  certain  shortcomings  in the  basic  setup.  To  illustrate  the relevance  of the  theoretical  results,39
eywords:
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ease-ﬁre
we  brieﬂy  describe  the circumstances  that  have  characterized  the negotiation  processes  between  the
Colombian  government  and  various  illegal  groups  in  this  long-lasting  armed  conﬂict.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.olombia
. Introduction
Why  do some internal conﬂicts succeed in reaching a truce,
emobilization or a negotiated settlement while in others the com-
atants withdraw from the negotiating table and return to war  or do
ot even consider the possibility of a truce? Why  do some processes
ail, even when they have managed to get opposing parties to sit
own to talk? These questions are posed in a growing body of litera-
ure on internal conﬂict and peace processes that points out several
easons for the failures and successes of conﬂict resolution efforts.
mong the explanatory factors are the type and terms of the set-
lement, lack of third-party support, the signiﬁcance of ethnic and
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND lreligious identities, and economic and political incentives. In addi-
tion, a number of sensitive points in the peace process have been
identiﬁed as possibly complicating the process. They include the
strategies and objectives of each party, ongoing hostilities during
the peace process and the design of the negotiation agenda.
The literature on civil war termination and conﬂict resolution
has two main streams. The ﬁrst one is the rational choice approach,
which considers negotiated settlement as a function of economic,
institutional or military conditions that may  encourage combatants
to initiate dialog. From this perspective, the success of negotiations
largely depends on the presence of speciﬁc, or even unique con-
ditions. The second approach, which relies on conﬂict resolution
techniques, underlines the ability of parties to solve their conﬂicts.
In other words, once dialog is initiated, the success of the process
relies on parties’ ability to put an end to the inner reasons for war.
In this paper, we  follow the former approach, rational choice.
We study conﬂict between two agents, a guerrilla group and
the government. We assume that the conﬂict is triggered by dis-
tributive issues, namely, guerrillas ﬁght in order to expropriate
legal agents’ income and thus increase their own  income. Legal
agents are represented by the government and they can invest in
defense in order to reduce the appropriated share. Each agent has
two possible strategies: cease-ﬁre or rejection of the truce. For the
guerrilla group, the cease-ﬁre implies relinquishing the appropri-
ated income but also reducing confrontation-related costs. For the
icense.
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own  feasibility and as to the willingness of the other party to
implement them”. Dal Bó and Powell (2007) claim that insiders
often have better information about an organization’s resources
2 Other branches of the literature ﬁnd that inequality affects crime, homicides,
robbery and imprisonment (Dollar et al., 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 1998, 1999, 2002;06 H. Zuleta et al. / The Journal of 
overnment, the cease-ﬁre strategy implies a reduction in defense
xpenditure but also a higher appropriated share if the guerrilla
roup chooses the no-truce strategy.
In this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a
edeﬁnition of the game in which an agent may  commit to trans-
er a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991, 1992),
nd explain the conditions under which a system of pre-donations
ay  facilitate a truce. We  ﬁnd that for conﬂicts involving high costs
here is a pre-donations scheme, acceptable for both parties, which
akes cease-ﬁre the best strategy. However, in many cases the
onditions are not right for the scheme of pre-donations to be effec-
ive. Given that we adopt a broad concept of wealth which includes
olitical power, a pre-donations scheme, which normally implies
ransfer of wealth, may  also imply transfer of political power.
We also analyze some limitations of the proposed framework
nd extend the model in order to deal with some of these short-
omings. First, we consider the case of different perceptions about
he strength of the parties which reduces the possibility of an
cceptable pre-donations scheme. In particular, overconﬁdence
ay  explain why some agents in conﬂict do not accept a peace-
ul settlement. Second, we  consider the relation between military
xpenditure and appropriated share, assuming that the strength
f the parties depends on the money invested in weapons, mili-
ary organization, etc. In this case a pre-donations scheme is useful
o reduce military expenditure and, therefore, the intensity of the
onﬂict. However, escalation of warfare may  be the appropriate
trategy for both parties in order to increase the chances of an
cceptable pre-donations scheme. Finally, illegal groups may  have
ther income sources (e.g. coca and poppy crops), in which case the
uccess of a pre-donations system depends not only on the costs
f the conﬂict, but also on the income that rebels draw from non-
ppropriative activities. In this case, the efforts of the government
ay  be directed at destroying illegal sources of income.
In general, the feasibility of a successful pre-donations system
epends on the relationship between the costs of the conﬂict and
he income of legal agents, as well as on the perceptions of the
wo parties of their relative strengths and the trust between them.
n, general, the feasibility of the pre-donations solution increases
ith the costs of the conﬂict. Additionally, the presence of a trusted
ediator may  increase the likelihood of a successful pre-donation
olution when there is lack of trust and different perceptions.
Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical
esults, we brieﬂy describe some of the circumstances that have
haracterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian
overnment and various illegal groups. In particular, we  refer to
he negotiation attempts with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
olombia (known by the acronym FARC) between 1991 and 1998,
he successful negotiation with and eventual demobilization of the
-19 guerrillas at the end of the 1980s, and the negotiation process
etween the Colombian government and the right-wing paramili-
ary group United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (known by the
cronym AUC) in 2003. We  also refer brieﬂy to the negotiation pro-
ess started in 2012 between FARC and the government known as
iálogos de La Habana.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
eview the related literature. In Section 3 we present the basic game
nd results. In Section 4, we extend the basic model and, ﬁnally, we
onclude in Section 5.
. Literature review.1. Theory and international evidence
In the literature on conﬂicts, income inequality is usually con-
idered to be one of the determinants of economic conﬂicts. RussetEconomics 47 (2013) 105– 117
(1964) was  one of the ﬁrst scholars to test the correlation between
inequality and violence, and found evidence of a linear relation
between the Gini coefﬁcient and the number of violent deaths
between 1950 and 1962. After Russet (1964), several studies have
addressed the issue of inequality and conﬂicts. However, there is
no consensus about the empirical results. Some authors claim that
inequality in the distribution of assets increases the likelihood of
social conﬂicts (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), while others ﬁnd no
such causal relation (Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoefﬂer, 1998, 1999,
2004).
In recent decades, scholars have reﬁned research techniques and
narrowed the object of studies repeatedly ﬁnding that, while verti-
cal income inequality does not increase the risk of war onset (Collier
and Hoefﬂer, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), horizontal inequali-
ties, i.e. social and economic disparities between societal groups,
seem to be positively related with the outbreak of conﬂict (Stewart,
2002; Østby, 2008).2
On the theoretical side, Jack Hirshleifer made one of the ﬁrst
attempts to model economic conﬂicts. The economic theory of con-
ﬂict follows, in general terms, the framework built by Hirshleifer
(1987, 1988, 1989) and is based upon the assumption that agents
involved in conﬂicts optimally split their resources between pro-
ductive activities and conﬂict.3
Following this approach, some authors study the effectiveness
of income re-distribution as a way  to solve conﬂicts. Grossman
(1995) claims that the redistribution of property income to the
working class may  be the optimal response of the propertied class
to the threat of illegal appropriation. Along the same lines, Mejía
and Posada (2006) explain that ruling elites in oligarchic societies
may  rely on income redistribution to the poor in order to prevent
them from attempting a revolution.
Other authors4 have shown that land reforms, changes in ﬁscal
policy and other ways of redistributing income or wealth may  be in
the interest of the agents who  are giving up a share of their wealth.
Finally, Noh (2002) brings new elements to the analysis, showing
that the best way to end a distributive conﬂict may be a combination
of income transfers and military expenditure.
One of the main problems regarding civil conﬂict is that the
agents in conﬂict are often not willing to settle. So, in order to
understand the real possibilities of a settlement, the issue of nego-
tiation must be addressed. On the one hand, there is no complete
information; therefore perceptions about the probability of victory
differ among agents, reducing the likelihood of a settlement. On
the other hand, the demands of the rebels often go beyond income
re-distribution to include political power. Manson and Fett (1996)
address the ﬁrst issue. Assuming a simple model of rational calcu-
lation of the utility and cost of war and settlement, they introduce
uncertainty in the analysis. In this setting, the likelihood that both
parties will agree to a settlement depends to a great extent on each
party’s estimate of its probability of victory.
Other authors have studied the problem of asymmetric infor-
mation. Zartman (2001) argues that incentives to settle can come
in two forms, as current or as contingent modiﬁers of present
values. Contingent incentives must be credible, “both as to theirJacobs and Helms, 1996).
3 Several studies have extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. See, among others,
Grossman (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Neary (1997), Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007),
Dixit (2004), Spolaore (2004), Zuleta (2004), Caruso (2006) and Zuleta (2008).
4 See Azam (1995), Roemer (1998) and Zuleta (2004), among others.
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Traditionally, academic discussion about the internal conﬂict in
Colombia has primarily focused on the social and political meaningH. Zuleta et al. / The Journal of 
han outsiders do and this informational asymmetry may  lead to
nefﬁcient conﬂict over the distribution of such resources. From
nother perspective, Shanchez-Pages (2009) argues that, in an
nvironment of incomplete information, the conﬂict may  open
he door to agreement if the uninformed agent is optimistic, but
onfrontation persists if the uninformed agent is pessimistic.
Regarding the demand for political power and institutional
hange, Shugart (1992, p. 122) considers the rational calculation of
nding a conﬂict by democratic means: “Institutional change may
ower barriers to entry for new participants in the political market,
herefore, negotiations over the institutional rules of the game are
sually crucial components of any electoral settlement”.
Political reform and stalemate are two main components that
hange parties’ behavior and incentives. The prospect of inclusive
olitical reform, accommodation and devolution reduces the ben-
ﬁts of war, so increases the chances of negotiation. On the other
ide, mutually hurting stalemate can get the process started by
ushing parties to listen to incentives and negotiate. In addition,
oth types of incentives have to be credible, and mediation by a
hird party may  provide the required credibility.
Finally, Collier and Hoefﬂer (1998) and Collier (2000) state that
ivil wars occur where rebel organizations are ﬁnancially viable,
ostly in countries with low income, low growth and economies
ased principally on the export of commodities. The way to end
 civil war depends on how public policies reduce the economic
isk factors: changing economic patterns, diversifying production
nd establishing international cooperation to reduce illegal trade,
ith sanctions making the economic and military circumstances
f rebellion more difﬁcult. In addition, Berdal and Malone (2000)
xpose the political economy of civil war (the rebels’ economic
ystem and the opportunities generated by war) and they suggest
hat one way to end war is to “deactivate the belligerents’ ﬁnancial
pigot” (Berdal and Malone, 2000, p. 14). The greater the beneﬁts of
he war economy, the less likely it is that a negotiated settlement
ill be initiated.
We introduce a simple framework (pre-donations) that allows
he majority of the elements discussed above to be considered from
 rational choice perspective. We  are aware of the limitations of
he analytical tools, which nevertheless help to model economic
onditions and deﬁne the strategies and incentives faced by the
gents.
.2. The role of third parties in a pre-donations scheme
A peace agreement often cannot be reached because the parties
o not even consider the possibility of negotiating. Sometimes,
ven when negotiation is possible, lack of trust between the parties
roves to be a permanent obstacle to reaching agreements. In these
ircumstances, intervention by a trusted third party may  be use-
ul to facilitate both the beginning of a negotiation process and
he reaching of agreements. In other words, a third party may  be
nstrumental in a successful pre-donations scheme.
Third party interventions have been studied by several authors
sing a variety of frameworks.5 Bercovitch (2009) deﬁnes third-
arty intervention as “a process of conﬂict management, related
o but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in
onﬂict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an
utsider to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so with-
ut resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.” The
utsider may  be an individual, a group, an organization or a state.6
5 See Gershenson (2002), Siqueira (2003), Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007), Chang
t  al. (2007b), Chang and Sanders (2009) and Amegashie (2010) among others.
6 Intervention by third parties may  take place in labor disputes (Hillman et al.,
987), competition for public goods (Siqueira and Sandler, 2004), trade disputesEconomics 47 (2013) 105– 117 107
The success or failure of conﬂict negotiation varies directly
with the presence or absence of an outside mediator. According
to Rothchild (2003), third parties may regulate the use of coercive
(diplomatic pressures and incentives, sanctions and military force)
and non-coercive (purchase, insurance, legitimation and promise of
economic support) incentives in the process of prevention and solu-
tion of conﬂict. In addition, Walter (2002) suggests that third parties
have an active role in terms of mediation, veriﬁcation and coercion
to create a credible commitment between the parties. Moreover,
she suggests that the success of mediation goes beyond the accord
and that it is necessary to involve third parties in the peace-building
process.7
Third-party participation appears to be a growing necessity in
peace processes. However, third-party participation is not a condi-
tion sine qua non as it may  foster conﬁdence but may also reduce
it. Third parties also have incentives and interests of their own
regarding conﬂict resolution, so their intervention may  not be phil-
anthropic per se but may  aim to satisfy speciﬁc interests.
According to Yilmaz (2001), a third party intervening in internal
conﬂicts uses three modes to accomplish her goal: ‘communi-
cation’, ‘formulation’, and ‘manipulation’. When direct contact
between the parties is impossible, the third party serves as com-
municator, facilitating contacts. During negotiations the third party
may  formulate ideas or possible solutions when the parties are
deadlocked. When the third party acts as a manipulator, it uses
its power to bring the parties to an agreement.
When the third party acts as a communicator, wording, accuracy
and conﬁdentiality are essential. The third party as a formulator
must be capable of thinking of ways to unblock the thinking of
the parties. Also, it must be convincing and persistent because
the characteristics of the conﬂict often prevent the parties from
ﬁnding solutions and may  also prevent them from seeing the value
of the third-party’s suggestions at ﬁrst hearing. The third party as
a manipulator needs to use political and economic punishments
and rewards to push the parties toward a solution (Zartman and
Touva, 1996).
In our basic framework, the third party facilitates negotiation
(communicator) and suggests the pre-donation scheme (formula-
tor). Additionally, the usefulness of a third party becomes more
important when there is neither a commitment device nor trust
and when the parties have different perceptions about their rela-
tive strength. Although we  do not explicitly model the behavior of
the third party, the inﬂuence of mediators is reﬂected in some of
the variables and parameters of the model.
In Colombia third parties have been present in all negotiation
processes. Representatives of two  or more countries have often
accompanied negotiations. Colombian politicians and social leaders
have also served as facilitators. Mediation was sometimes success-
ful, sometimes not. In the next sections we  relate the results of
different processes considering the role played by mediators.
2.3. Understanding the case of Colombia(Busch and Reinhardt, 2006), litigation over property rights (Robson and Skaperdas,
2008), among others. However, we focus this section on third-party intervention in
armed conﬂicts.
7 Walter (2002) exposes two critical barriers to civil war settlement: short-term
demobilization and rebuilding national armed forces and long-term devolution of
rebel-controlled territory: “This dual process creates two opportunities for exploita-
tion, and this is the reason so many civil wars fail to end with successful settlements
.  . . Settlements of civil wars, therefore, have the unintended and unfortunate effect
of forcing factions through a highly risky implementation period that may  leave
them signiﬁcantly worse off than they would have been had they kept their armies
and  continued to ﬁght”.
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f Colombian violence. One of the pioneer studies was published
n 1983 by a multidisciplinary group of social scientists known
s the violentólogos. Among other hypotheses, the violentólogos
elated the growing violence to a number of causes, including eco-
omic deprivation. In the absence of alternative explanations, they
ecame part of the conventional wisdom.
A decade later, three quantitative studies by Gaitán (1995),
ubio (1995), and Montenegro and Posada (1995) presented a dif-
erent approach and challenged the violentólogo theory. Since then,
cholars and social scientists have approached the issue from dif-
erent perspectives.8
.3.1. Causes
In general, identiﬁcation of the causes is the ﬁrst step in pro-
iding elements for resolving the conﬂict. Castillo and Salazar
1999) argue that rebels have abandoned their ideological and
ocial dimension, moving toward an emerging economic and mili-
ary dimension. Gorbaneff and Jacome (2000), following Grossman
1991, 1994), model rational decisions of the three agents: peas-
nts, government and insurgents. Decisions are based on the gains
f participating with competing groups, represented by wage.
inally, Zuleta and Andonova (2009) use a general equilibrium
odel à la Grossman (1991). They ﬁnd a low-wage equilibrium
ith guerrilla activity and a peaceful, high-wage equilibrium and
rgue that, by means of compensation policies, entrepreneurs and
ot the government might be able to protect their assets against
xpropriation.9
These models identify some of the economic causes of the
olombian conﬂict. However, other authors ﬁnd others. Cante
2003), following Elster (2001), argues that civil society decisions
re affected by personal and social compromises that may  be more
omplex than simple economic gains.
Isaza and Campo (2005) calibrated a dynamic model of war  try-
ng to match the Colombian data. They pay special attention to the
opulation that chooses to enroll in illegal armed groups and ﬁnd
hat it is more efﬁcient to undertake programs focusing on the pop-
lation deemed at risk than to focus exclusively on military strategy
s a way to solve conﬂicts.
Recently, some authors have aimed to identify the causes of the
onﬂict using empirical methods. Angrist and Kugler (2005) ﬁnd
hat, in the early 1990s when coca production shifted from other
ations to Colombia, violent deaths increased substantially in coca-
rowing regions.10 Dube and Vargas (2006) show that negative
rice shocks in the international coffee market exacerbated civil
onﬂict in Colombia. They present evidence supporting the idea
hat municipal expenditure reduced the effects that the crisis had
n guerrilla attacks. Finally, they show that poverty is associated
ith greater violence.11
Although the literature about the causes of the conﬂict seems
isperse, from the above review it is possible to identify three
actors: unease produced by income inequality and institutional
rrangements, poverty and the existence of easy sources of income
like illegal crops)..3.2. Costs
According to Collier (2000), there are three main channels
hrough which civil wars affect the economy: destruction of
8 See Castillo and Salazar (1999), Posada and Gonzalez (2000), Cante (2003), Zuleta
2004), Isaza and Campo (2005), Zuleta (2008), among others.
9 Andonova and Zuleta (2007) present a case study that is consistent with this
ypothesis.
10 Deininger (2003) and Barron et al. (2004) provide empirical studies for other
ountries.
11 This evidence is consistent with the ﬁndings of Miguel and Sergenti (2004) and
uleta (2008).Economics 47 (2013) 105– 117
resources, disruption caused by the suppression of civil liber-
ties and diversion of expenditure from productive activities. In
Colombia, Rubio (1995), London˜o and Guerrero (1999) and Mejía
and Posada (2003) among others, provide calculations of these
costs.
Trujillo and Badel (1998) build on Rubio (1995) and quantify
the gross costs of the conﬂict. According to them, terrorist actions
by guerrilla groups have focused on the electricity infrastructure.
They estimate repair costs at US$ 18 million during 1999 and 2000.
However, these replacement costs may  be small compared to the
costs of suspending transmission and generation. Mejía and Posada
(2003) argue that the total damages from attacks to the Can˜o Limon
– Coven˜as oil pipeline during 2000 amounted to U$ 12.3 million.
Levitt and Rubio (2000) present a summary of the literature on
the costs of violence in Colombia. The estimated public costs of
security and justice represent 5% of GDP. Guerrero and London˜o
(1999) calculate that direct material losses in Colombia are 6.4% of
GDP and the costs of violence determined by lost productivity and
investment are 2% of GDP.
Although there are no calculations of investments forgone due to
violence and uncertainty in Colombia, the cross-country empirical
evidence is signiﬁcant regarding the negative effect that violence
has on investment decisions (Alesina et al., 1996).
Summarizing, there is enough empirical evidence indicating
that the costs of the conﬂict are immense for Colombian society.
However, to the best of our knowledge there is no evidence at all
regarding the costs faced by guerrilla and paramilitary groups. This
data is instrumental to determine their real incentives.
2.3.3. Third party
The Colombian government has gone through several negotia-
tion processes with different results. In some cases there was no
need for a third party while in other cases the role of the mediators
was key to the success or failure of the process.
The example that best illustrates the importance of third parties
is the experience with the FARC.
In the early 1980s negotiations between the Betancur admin-
istration and the FARC ended in amnesty and cease-ﬁre. The
cease-ﬁre was initially respected by both parties, but the FARC
did not completely demobilize. A new political party, the UP
(Union Patriótica), was founded and several FARC members were
among its founders. However, by 1987, the UP’s leadership was
being gradually but increasingly decimated by violent attacks and
assassinations carried out by drug lords, paramilitary groups and
some members of the government’s armed forces. Meanwhile, the
cease-ﬁre was  gradually collapsing due to regional guerrilla and
Army skirmishes. All these episodes of violence destroyed the trust
between the two  parties and made any negotiation attempt impos-
sible for several years.
In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War  together with the
peace processes in Guatemala and El Salvador gave some hope
about the chances of a new negotiation process. Both the Venezue-
lan and the Mexican government played the role of facilitators.
However, the lack of trust plus the distance between the parties
involved made any agreement impossible. On top of that, Mexico
and Venezuela did not act as formulators so their presence did not
help to bring positions closer.In 1997 three political leaders, including Juan Manuel Santos,
made contact with international delegates of the FARC. But it was
Alvaro Leyva Durán12 who ﬁnally served as facilitator for the ﬁrst
12 Alvaro Leyva is a Colombian politician who had had contacts with different guer-
rilla groups for several years before the Pastrana administration began dialog with
guerrillas.
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• How effective the government is in defense: (parameters T and
(P0 − P1))
• How wealthy the representative legal agent IL is.
13 We deal with the case of illegal sources of income in Section 4.
14 According to Collier (2000), there are three types of cost. We  are not explicitlyH. Zuleta et al. / The Journal of 
ontact between Andrés Pastrana and the guerrilla leaders. How-
ver, Leyva did not play any role during the negotiations.
The negotiation process began in 1998, and international inter-
ention was limited to the U.S.A. through the Plan Colombia and,
n the late phase of the peace talks, the European Union countries.
urthermore, the FARC disliked the international community and
iewed it as explicitly supporting the Colombian state. They were
keptical about the international community’s neutrality so pre-
erred to keep it out of the negotiation. The FARC only accepted a
ypothetical participation of the international community as veri-
ers of signed commitments between the parties.
In January 2001, FARC accepted international participation
nder the arrangement of a “Facilitating Group”. The main role
f this group was to guarantee no military “invasion” in the
egotiating zone and to guarantee its security. Its next task was
o participate in the cease-ﬁre negotiations, but the FARC deci-
ion to hijack a commercial airline and kidnap the head of the
olombian Senate’s Peace Commission overshadowed active par-
icipation by the international community in the dialog. However,
y any standard, the third-party attempt to generate conﬁdence
mong the parties was timid. More importantly, the subsequent
lan Colombia, understood as international participation, was  not
iming to end the conﬂict in a negotiated way but by military
eans. In fact, the Plan Colombia did not contemplate any peace
nitiatives and, instead of creating conﬁdence among the parties, it
xacerbated distrust.
The 2012 negotiation with the FARC in La Habana in Cuba pre-
ented a different perspective on the importance of third-party
articipation. In August 2012, after about one decade of armed
onﬂict and escalation of violence between the FARC and the mil-
tary forces, President Santos announced an existing secret dialog
ith the FARC as a preamble to peace talks in Olso, Norway and La
abana, Cuba. These talks were attended by representatives from
orway, Venezuela, Chile and Cuba. According to Yilmaz (2001),
enezuela may  also have played the role of manipulator: Venezuela
s an important trade partner of Colombia; it can serve as a shelter
or the rebels and it has a great inﬂuence over other Latin-American
ountries. Additionally, FARC leaders are increasingly adopting the
iscourse of Hugo Chavez, Venezuela’s late president, and present
heir case as a Bolivarian Revolution. Reciprocally, the government
f Venezuela refuses to include the FARC in the list of terrorist
roups. Therefore, if the Colombian government does not honor
he agreements, the government of Venezuela can commercially
solate the country and shelter the guerrillas. On the other hand,
f the FARC does not honor the agreements, the government of
enezuela can include it in the list of terrorist groups and deny
helter and protection to its leaders.
. The basic game
We  use a theoretical game approach. There are two agents:
overnment and rebels. Each agent chooses between two  possi-
le strategies: confrontation (war) and truce. If both agents choose
 truce, then both total income and income distribution are given.
f the rebels choose confrontation, they have to pay a cost but they
ay get a bigger share of total income; that is, there may  be a redis-
ribution of total income in their favor. If the government chooses
 truce while the rebels choose confrontation, then peaceful citi-
ens lose a share of their income in favor of the rebels. Finally, if
oth agents choose confrontation, then both agents pay costs, net
ncome is reduced and income distribution depends on the relative
ilitary power of the agents.
Note that the task of the government is to defend the citizens
f the country and the main objective is to guarantee protection
f property rights. In other words, the government does notEconomics 47 (2013) 105– 117 109
want to expropriate illegal agents. When the illegal armed agents
honor the cease-ﬁre, the income they receive does not come from
expropriating illegal agents. Therefore, their income does not
depend on whether the government honors the cease-ﬁre or not.
However, if the illegal armed group does not honor the truce, then
any military action taken by the government would reduce the
income of illegal groups as part of their income comes from illegal
activities.13
We deﬁne below the variables, the strategies, the basic game
and some of the results.
Deﬁnitions
IL: Legal agents’ initial income.
II: Illegal armed group’s initial income.
C: Illegal armed group’s operational costs.
T: Defense costs. In Collier terms (2000), T represents the costs of
repressing and deterring criminal activities.14
P0: Share of income appropriated by guerrilla groups when the
government does not invest in defense.
P1: Share of income appropriated by guerrilla groups when the
government invests in defense.
No truce: Strategy in which the agent invests in war.
Assumption 1. There is only one guerrilla group and it behaves
like one agent.
Assumption 2. The government represents the interests of legal
agents.
Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to model the problem with only
two agents.
The basic game is described as follows.
Results
1. If P0. IL > C, then Cease-Fire, Cease-Fire (CF,CF) is not a Nash equi-
librium.
The proof is straightforward: If P0·IL > C, then (II − C) + P0·IL > II
so when the government chooses Cease-Fire the best strategy
for the rebels is No Truce.
2. No Truce, No Truce (N,N) is a Nash equilibrium if:
P1 · (IL − T) > C and IL(P0 − P1) > T(1 − P1)
The proof is straightforward:
If P1 · (IL − T) > C then II − C + P1 · (IL − T) > II so when the govern-
ment chooses No Truce the best strategy for the rebels is No Truce
If IL(P0 − P1) > T(1 − P1) then (IL − T)(1 − P1) > IL(1 − P0) so when
the rebels choose No Truce the best strategy for the government is
No Truce.
In this setting the possibility of a truce depends on:
• How effective the guerrilla group is with appropriation (param-
eters C and P0)modeling costs of destruction and the negative impact that violence has on invest-
ment decisions. If we were to include these costs explicitly for the outcomes N,N
and CF,N, the variable IL would be multiplied by a factor lower than one. However,
given that we are considering P0 < 1, P1 < 1 and C > 0, the inclusion of such a multiplier
would be qualitatively redundant and would complicate notation.
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These results are similar to those obtained by Hirshleifer
1991a,b, 1994), Skaperdas (1992) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos
1997). However, in our framework the strategy of the guerrilla
roup depends on the income of legal agents and on the appropri-
ted share and not directly on income distribution. Therefore, the
quilibrium N,N is possible even if II > IL.15
From now on, we assume that under the initial conditions, and
n the absence of additional mechanisms, N,N is a Nash Equilibrium
nd is unique:
ssumption 3.
0 · IL > C
ssumption 4.
1 · (IL − T) > C
ssumption 5.
L(P0 − P1) > T(1 − P1)
The continuing climate of no-truce, no-negotiation by the
rmed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) between 1992 and
998 ﬁts into the logic of the basic game and is consistent with
ssumptions 1–5.
At that time, the end of the Tlaxcala talks pushed this group
nto strengthening its armed forces and implementing a violent
scalation against the government, the army and civil society. Nei-
her the FARC nor the government suggested reinitiating talks or a
ease-ﬁre.
Following the basic game, the FARC was in a situation in which
he share of income appropriated by it was greater than its opera-
ional costs. Basically, the FARC managed to increase the number of
ombatants in its ranks due to the linkage between the guerrillas
nd the illicit drugs industry, which boosted its resources and made
t increasingly difﬁcult to adopt a strategy of withdrawing from its
llegal and illicit activities.
In the same way, the government, which found itself in a trou-
led institutional situation, did not suggest peace talks. Because of
ts defence costs at the time and the share of income appropriated
y the guerrilla group, it had no possibility of changing its strategy
nd got stuck in a no truce strategy.
.1. Sertel–Azam–Roemer solution
Assume that a third party, accepted by both players, proposes
 re-deﬁnition of the game where legal agents can choose to pre-
onate a share  of their income (see Sertel, 1991, 1992).16 In this
ew setting, the game is described as follows,
15 This result may be striking at ﬁrst sight as many authors claim that inequality
s  one of the determinants of civil conﬂicts. However, in Colombia, guerrilla groups
ontrol coca crops so have an important source of income that is unrelated to appro-
riative activities. As will become apparent, this fact reduces the efﬁcacy of the
re-donations scheme.
16 Sertel (1992) proves that, in many games, pre-donations are a useful mechanism
or  inducing the optimum.II IL(1 − P0) (II − C) + P0·IL
II (IL − T)(1 − P1) (II − C) + P1·(IL − T)
Proposition 1. A system of pre-donations induces guerrilla
groups to cease ﬁre if the pre-donated amount is such that  >(
1 − CP0IL
)
.
The guerrilla group is willing to cease ﬁre if the pre-donated
amount in scenario CF,CF is bigger than the appropriated amount
plus the pre-donated amount in scenario CF,N minus the cost of
belligerence. In other words, the illegal armed group is willing to
cease ﬁre if IL > P0IL + IL(1 − P0) − C, rearranging,  > (1 − (C/P0IL).
Similarly, if  > (1(C/(P1(IL − T)))), when the strategy of the gov-
ernment is N, then the best strategy for the guerrilla group is CF.
Assumption 5 implies that C/ILP0 < C/((IL − T)P1). Therefore, pre-
donations are an efﬁcient mechanism if  > (1 − (C/(P0IL))).
Proposition 2. A system of pre-donations is acceptable by legal
agents if the pre-donated amount  is such that (T + P1(IL − T))/IL > .
Legal agents are willing to pre-donate if their equilibrium pay-
off in the redeﬁned game is better than the equilibrium payoff in
the initial game. Formally, if IL(1 − ) > (IL − T)(1 − P1), then legal
agents are willing to pre-donate. The condition can be rearranged
as follows,
T + P1(IL − T) > IL.
Therefore, the pre-donations mechanism is convenient for both
players if the pre-donated equilibrium amount is lower than the
defense costs, T, plus the appropriated amount, P1(IL − T).
Proposition 3. If C/((1 − P1)P0) > IL − T, then there is a feasible and
effective pre-donation mechanism.
According to Propositions 1 and 2, the pre-
donation system must satisfy the following condition:
(T + P1(IL − T))/IL >  > (1 − (C/P0IL))
Now, if C/((1 − P1)P0) > IL − T then (T + P1(IL − T))/IL >
(1 − (C/P0IL)).
Therefore, if C/((1 − P1)P0) > IL − T, there is a pre-donation sys-
tem that is feasible and desirable for both parties.
Summarizing, the success of a pre-donations system depends on
the costs of the conﬂict, C and T, compared to the income of legal
agents, IL.
In other words, for any conﬂict involving high costs there is a
distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that the
best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. This result is similar
to those obtained by Azam (1995) and Roemer (1998) in different
settings.
The Sertel–Azam–Roemer solution is a change in the bargaining
problem, where the agents have the possibility to make trans-
fers before the bargain is reached. Following Sertel (1992), we will
assume that the pre-donations are not only monetary but may  also
be non-monetary.
The case of government negotiation with the United Self Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2003 shows a pre-donation that
reshaped the bargaining among the groups and clearly presented a
transfer between them. There were two types of pre-donations:a. Pre-donation that increased the share of income appropriated by
the illegal armed group – AUC – by means of an income (wage) if
they demobilized. This income was given individually to ex-AUC
members replacing the cost of mobilization.
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. Pre-donation that increased the share of income appropriated by
leaders of the illegal armed group – AUC – by means of judicial
beneﬁts stemming from the promise and credibility of the future
peace negotiation.
Both pre-donations ﬁt into the model as they take place before
he negotiation and are a condition for cease-ﬁre and for initiating
eace talks.
With Uribe’s election as President in 2002, the AUC began to
eshape its armed strategy. It reduced the scale of violence, tur-
ing from massacres to selective assassinations. On December 1,
bout 4 months after president Uribe took ofﬁce, the leader of AUC
eclared a cease-ﬁre and the government announced the initiation
f contacts to negotiate demobilization.
The government, representing peaceful citizens, offered a
ramework that moderated the existing laws and sentences for
ajor crimes.17 The AUC expected to obtain a blanket pardon
or major drug trafﬁckers inside the AUC, to secure amnesty for
ast massacres and violence, and to legalize its growing economic
nvolvement in the agricultural sector.
As a result of a pre-donation scheme, demobilization was
eached and almost 15,000 combatants have been demobilized
ince 2003.
Another case that ﬁts in this framework was the successful nego-
iation with three illegal armed groups during the late eighties. At
hat time, president Barco (1986–1990) offered a speciﬁc unilat-
ral peace proposal in exchange for the demobilization of guerrilla
roups. The M-19 entered negotiation with two  aims: amnesty
nd political inclusion. In 1989, the M-19 demobilized and gave
irth to a new political party, the Democratic Alliance M-19, with
easonable popular support.
As a result of the negotiated settlement with M-19, President
aviria (1990–1994) initiated talks with other small groups that
ubsequently demobilized: the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), the
uintín Lame, and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT). During
his time two events set the stage for demobilization: a success-
ul peace accord with the M-19, and elections for the National
onstituent Assembly (in order to write the new political con-
titution). The M-19 accord was a unique peace agreement for
olombia because it opened up a new perspective for combat-
nts, with the possibilities of amnesty and reincorporation into civil
ociety. The election for a National Constituent Assembly provided
ormer combatants with the opportunity to be co-authors of an
nclusive constitution, and ﬁght for their interests in the democratic
rena.
17 Law of Peace and Justice in June 2005. This law has been deeply criticized
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, domestic human rights NGOs, scho-
ars and civil society among others) because it signiﬁcantly reduces criminal
entences associated with massacres, human rights violations, kidnappings and ter-
orist activities (prison terms of twenty years reduced to around ﬁve to eight years).
n  addition, the law does not include the obligation to reveal the truth of past ille-
al  actions: there is no requirement for combatants to confess their war crimes or
eveal any existing connection with civilians or politicians.
18 This section builds on Dal Bó and Powell (2007) who  claim that insiders often
ave better information about an organization’s resources than outsiders do and
his informational asymmetry may  lead to inefﬁcient conﬂict over the distribution
f such resources.IL(1 − P0)(1 − ) (II − C) + P0·IL + IL(1 − P0)
(IL − T)(1 − P1)(1 − ) (II − C) + P1·(IL − T) + (IL − T)(1 − P1)
3.2. Absence of a commitment device and lack of trust18
If there is no commitment device that enforces (or guaran-
tees) the promise of a transfer then the government may  decide
not to make the promised transfer. In this case a problem of
trust arises. We  model this lack of trust assuming that the pre-
donation expected from the illegal groups e is smaller than the
one promised by the government, e < . Under these conditions,
the game is described as follows,
In this case, the beliefs of the rebels change the set of acceptable
schemes. We  show this formally in Proposition 1a:
Proposition 1a. A system of pre-donations induces guerrilla
groups to cease ﬁre if the expected pre-donated amount is such
that e >
(
1 − CP0IL
)
.
Proposition 2 holds.
The expectations of the rebels are likely to be endogenous. In
other words, the members of the illegal group form their expecta-
tions according to the actions of the government. If the government
does not make the promised transfer then the rebels adjust their
expectations and, accordingly, intensify the ﬁght.
Under these circumstances, the possibilities of new negotiations
are reduced and, as long as a feasible and desirable pre-donation
scheme exists, the government would be worse off. Here, we
assume that the costs of confrontation are large enough to induce
the government to hold its promises.
Clearly, in this case a mediator can facilitate both the begin-
ning of a negotiation process and the reaching of an agreement. In
terms of the game, the third party can convince the rebels that the
government is going to fulﬁll its promises and can use the “third-
party threat” i.e. political and economic punishments and rewards,
in order to force the government to fulﬁll its promises.
As we stated before, the case which best illustrates this situa-
tion is the attempt to negotiate with the FARC in the early 1990s.
After the failed process of the 1980s and the violent attacks and
assassinations of UP leaders there was  no trust between the parties.
Additionally, international mediators had neither the will nor the
power to use the “third-party threat”.
4. Extending the game
The results presented in the previous section offer a ﬁrst step
for resolving conﬂicts. However, sometimes reality may  be more
complex for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, perceptions about relative
military power, P1 and P0, may  be different for illegal armed groups
and legal agents; second, military expenditure and appropriated
share are likely to be correlated with military spending; third,
agents within groups are very often heterogeneous and, ﬁnally, ille-
gal groups often have income sources which are illegal (coca and
poppy crops) but are not directly related to appropriative activities.
In this section we extend our framework in order to deal with some
of these limitations.4.1. Different perceptions
In order to model different perceptions we need to introduce
new elements in the game:
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by the government was  acceptable for both parties according to
its perceptions but not acceptable for the rebels according to their
perceptions.
20 3.67% of the Colombian territory, an area almost the size of Switzerland and the
largest area in the hands of the FARC ever since.Government
CF IL(1 − ) II + eIL
N  (IL − T)(1 − ) II + e(IL − T) 
Deﬁnitions
P0I: Illegal armed groups’ perception about the share of income
appropriated by illegal armed groups when the government does
not invest in defense.
P1I: Illegal armed groups’ perception about the share of income
appropriated by illegal armed groups when the government
invests in defense.
P0L: Government perception about the share of income appropri-
ated by illegal armed groups when the government does not invest
in defense.
P1L: Government perception about the share of income appro-
priated by illegal armed groups when the government invests in
defense.
We assume that P0I > P0L and P1I < P1L. Otherwise the differences
n perceptions would actually facilitate the truce, as will become
pparent below. We  also assume that each agent knows only its
erceptions and not those of the opponent.
In this setting, even though illegal armed groups and the gov-
rnment are the parties in conﬂict, they have different ex-ante
erceptions about the share of income appropriated by guerrilla
roups.
The different perception about the strength of the two parties
educes the possibilities of an agreement because the set of accept-
ble pre-donations schemes is reduced. This result is formally
resented in Propositions 4 and 5.
roposition 4. C > (1 − P1L)P0I(IL − T) is a sufﬁcient condition for
he pre-donation mechanism to be feasible and effective.
Following the same reasoning that we use above, we ﬁnd the
onditions for CF,CF to be an equilibrium.
Illegal armed groups are willing to Cease Fire if  > (1 − (C/P0IIL),
nd legal agents are willing to pre-donate if T + P1L(IL − T) > IL.
herefore, it is possible to ﬁnd a pre-donations system that is
cceptable for both parties if C > (1 − P1L)P0I(IL − T). This condition
s more restrictive than the one found in the Sertel–Azam–Roemer
olution because P0I > P0L and P1I < P1L. Thus, even if there are “objec-
ive conditions” for a pre-donations system to generate the CF,CF
quilibrium, different perceptions may  destroy the effectiveness
f the mechanism. Indeed, we can ﬁnd critical levels for the per-
eption about the share of income appropriated by illegal armed
roups:
If P1L < (1 − (C/((IL − T)P0I)) then there are no pre-donation
chemes acceptable for both parties.19
In this case an informed and trusted mediator can facilitate the
egotiation process. The facilitator can help the parties to see their
istakes and revise their perceptions. In terms of the game, the
hird party can reduce the distance between P0I and P0L as well as
he distance between P1I and P1L.
The situation described above shows that opponent groups
ave no incentives to stop the conﬂict unilaterally unless they
eceive an enormous pre-donation that would not be acceptable
or the rival group. This might have been the case of the peace
19 Note that the expressions P1L < (1 − (C/((IL − T)P0I)) and P0I > (C/((IL − T)(1 − P1L)))
re equivalent.IL(1 − P0)(1 − ) (II − C) + P0·IL + eIL(1 − P0)
(IL − T)(1 − P1)(1 − ) (II − C) + P1·(IL − T) + e(IL − T)(1 − P1)
negotiation process between the Armed Revolutionary Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the Government in the late nineties and early
2000.
At that time, the government was  very conﬁdent about the
possibility of reaching an accord. It offered a non-monetary pre-
donation to the FARC of territorial control (a demilitarized zone)
while war continued plus legal guarantees. In return, the FARC
offered to free 350 kidnapped policemen and to discuss the pro-
posed political agenda.
Contacts between the FARC and the presidential candidate
Andres Pastrana took place in 1998 during the presidential cam-
paign. Once the Pastrana government was in ofﬁce, the parties
established the conditions for initiating negotiations. During the
negotiation process, there was a perception that the govern-
ment conceded too much without demanding anything. The
FARC demanded the demilitarization of a region of Colombia
[42,000 km220], known as the Zona de Distension (demilitarized
zone), the removal of some ofﬁcers from the military, and a
crackdown on the paramilitaries. Meanwhile, the war contin-
ued as they did not agree to a cease-ﬁre during the negotiation
period.
On 9 January 1999, the peace talks were ofﬁcially inaugurated.
However, from the start, Manuel Marulanda, the FARC leader, made
it clear that his movement had more to demand than to offer. The
negotiation agenda21 showed the parties’ interest in the talks. Talks
started after this agenda had been deﬁned and the bargaining began
with the ﬁfth point (economic and social structure), speciﬁcally
economic reforms concerning unemployment. During the follow-
ing three years, the negotiation stuck on the same point without
obtaining an agreement or moving to another point.
The talks were held up by severe problems. The FARC showed
its unwillingness to bargain and presented its demands in such a
strong way that the government had to fulﬁll them if it wanted to
negotiate. The role of third parties was  very timid because the FARC
leaders did not trust international mediators. It suspended the talks
three times, pushed the government to maintain the demilitarized
zone and extended the deadline for it without any counterbalancing
commitment. Pastrana’s government tried to keep the talks going
at any price, meeting almost all the guerrilla demands without
achieving any agreement.
In terms of the model, the government was trying to set a  high
enough to be acceptable for the rebels. However, military power of
the rebels was perceived to be higher by illegal armed groups than
by legal agents (P0I > P0L and P1I < P1L). Therefore, the scheme offered21 The agenda “A Common Agenda for Change Toward a New Colombia” contained
the  following points: (1) Negotiated Political Solutions; (2) Protection of Human
Rights is a Responsibility of the State; (3) Integral Agrarian Policies; (4) Exploitation
and Conservation of Natural Resources; (5) Economic and Social Structure; (6) Justice
Reforms: the Fight Against Corruption and Drug-Trafﬁcking; (7) Political Reform and
the  Expansion of Democracy; (8) Reform of the State Agreements on International
Humanitarian Law; Armed Forces International Relations Formalizing Agreements
Signed 6 May  1999 in La Machaca (Demilitarized Zone).
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In addition, approval of the Plan Colombia22 widened the gap
etween the parties and further diminished the trust between
hem. According to the FARC, the Plan Colombia contradicted the
overnment position. It suggested that, on the one hand, the gov-
rnment called for peace while, on the other, it followed a strategy
f “peace diplomacy” aimed at strengthening the armed forces and
ghting against drug trafﬁckers.23
According to Zartman, the failure of negotiation highlights his
ypothesis that incentives can only be “effective when parties are
ufﬁciently dissatisﬁed with their present costs” (Zartman, 2001, p.
01). Talks with the FARC showed that they had not been damaged
nough and were not sufﬁciently pessimistic about the future to
e tempted by the incentives of the dialog process. Additionally,
he income that the rebels derived from coca and poppy crops was
n impediment for agreement on demobilizing the FARC. Along the
ame lines, Rangel (2003) suggests that the FARC had greater incen-
ives for staying at war than for signing an accord because they did
ot feel militarily powerless. This view ties in with Zartman’s idea:
he FARC saw its negotiation position as a way of strengthening
ts military power rather than as an incentive mechanism to make
eace offers.
The situation described above is therefore consistent with the
ogic of the extended game with different perceptions. The FARC
nd the army did not reach a truce because, on the one hand, the
ARC was demanding too much and was unwilling to give any-
hing up and, on the other, the government had a wrong perception
bout the willingness of the FARC and was over-conﬁdent about an
greement.
.2. Military expenditure and appropriated share
So far, we have assumed that military expenditures, C and T, do
ot affect military power P0 and P1. However, this assumption can
e relaxed as it is reasonable to assume that the appropriated share
ositively depends on the expenditure of the illegal armed group
nd negatively on the expenditure of the government, that is,
P0 = F(C) where FC(·) ≥0
P1 = G(C, T) where GC(·) ≥0, GT(·) ≤0.
For simplicity, let us assume the following function for P1:
(C, T) = C
C + T so GC (·) =
T
(C + T)2
, GT (·) = −
C
(C + T)2
and
GCT (·) =
T − C
(C + T)3
.
In other words, the strength of the parties depends on the money
nvested in weapons, military organization, etc.; when one party
ncreases its investment, the productivity of the money invested
y the other party is reduced.Now, suppose that N,N is a Nash Equilibrium and that it is
nique. Under these circumstances, rebels and government choose
 and T respectively in order to maximize their income in the case of
22 In 2000, after several meetings the U.S Congress approved $1.3 billion to support
he  Plan Colombia. Of this, $911 million was to reinforce the war  against drugs (aerial
umigation, destruction of coca labs and military training and strengthening), $106
illion to support alternative programs and the remaining $302 million for human
ights and justice. Behind the Plan Colombia was  the idea that guerrillas are major
rug dealers so, by eliminating drug trafﬁcking, Colombia would achieve two  goals,
he end of illicit trafﬁc and a victory over the guerrillas.
23 The FARC was  also involved in the coca and poppy business so had a very large
ource of income. This fact made it even more difﬁcult to achieve an agreement (see
ubsection iii).Economics 47 (2013) 105– 117 113
N,N equilibrium. If this is the case, in the absence of pre-donations
the Government’s problem is the following:
Max
T
(IL − T)(1 − G(C, T)). So,
T = IL −
1 − G(·)
GT (·)
(1)
Given that GT(·) ≤0, condition (1) implies that, when military
spending by the rebels grows, the optimal response is an increase
in military spending.
The problem of the rebels is Max
C
(II − C) + G(C, T)(IL − T). So
1
GC (·)
= (IL − T) so C =
√
T(IL − T) − T (2)
Condition (2) implies that the reaction function of the rebels is
not linear. For low values of C, the relation between C and T is posi-
tive but it turns negative for high values of C. Therefore, there may
be multiple equilibria. However, if an internal equilibrium exists, it
is characterized by Eq. (3)
GT (·)
GC (·)
= −(1 − G(·)) so T2 = (
√
T(IL − T) − T)IL (3)
4.2.1. The effect of Pre-donations
Under a pre-donations scheme the problems are:
Max
T
(IL − T)(1 − G(C, T))(1 − ) for the government and Max
C
(II −
C) + G(C, T)(IL − T) + (IL − T)(1 − G(C, T)) for the rebels.
It is straightforward to see that the reaction function of the gov-
ernment does not change but the reaction function of the rebels
does change:
C =
√
T(IL − T)(1 − ) − T (4)
Comparing Eqs. (2) and (4), it is clear that, with pre-donations,
the guerrilla groups have incentives to reduce military spend-
ing. Consequently, the government also has incentives to reduce
military spending. So a pre-donations scheme is useful to reduce
military expenditure and, therefore, the intensity of a conﬂict. The
next question is: can a change in military expenditure be helpful to
get a feasible and desirable pre-donations scheme?
4.3. Spending to get a good deal24
Under the assumptions we are making, the condition for the
pre-donations system to be acceptable reads, C > T/(C + T)F(C)(IL − T)
Rearranging,
C − T
C + T F(C)(IL − T) > 0 (5)
The relation between the left hand side of equation 5 and the
expenditure made by the parties is not evident. Moreover, the rela-
tion can be characterized by non-linearity. In order to explore this
possibility, we  characterize below the behavior of the left hand side
of Eq. (5).
Deﬁne:
˝(C, T) = C − T
C + T F(C)(IL − T)
So, derive with respect to T,(6)˝T (C, T) =
T2
(
C
(
IL
))F(C)
(C+T)2 1 − T T + 2
Therefore, if C < T2/(2T + IL) then any increase in the military
expenditure made by the government T increases LFS in Eq. (5).
24 This section is closely related to Noh (2002) who  shows that the availability of
income transfers to the other party results in equilibrium where both defense and
income transfer are utilized.
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treating the information problems and the link between military
expenditure and appropriated shares separately. However, it can14 H. Zuleta et al. / The Journal of 
n other words, by increasing T, the government may  generate the
onditions for a pre-donations scheme to be acceptable for both
arties. By investing more, the government increases the costs of
he conﬂict but the increase in military expenditure reduces the
ppropriated share so also increases incentives to negotiate for
uerrilla groups.
Guerrilla groups may  also invest some money in order to get a
etter deal. To see the effect of an increase in military expenditure
y the rebels, take function ˝(C, T) with respect to C,
C (C, T) = 1 +
T
(C + T)
(
1
(C + T)2
F(·) − FC (·)
)
(IL − T) (7)
Note that ˝C(C, T) may  be positive or negative:
A) If F(·)FC (·)≥(C + T)
2 or IL < T + C+TT 1(C+T)FC (·)−F(·) then ˝C(C, T) > 0,
and any increase in military expenditure by the illegal armed
group increases LHS in Eq. (5) and increases the chances of
success for pre-donation schemes.
B) If F(·)FC (·) < (C + T)
2 and IL > T + C+TT 1(C+T)FC (·)−F(·) then ˝C(C,
T) < 0, and any increase in military expenditure by the illegal
armed group decreases LHS in Eq. (5) and decreases the chances
of success for pre-donation schemes.
An increase in C generates a rise in the costs of conﬂict paid for
y the legal agents, increasing their incentive to negotiate. Addi-
ionally, the cost paid by illegal armed groups grows so they have
ore incentives to negotiate. However, as the appropriated share
ncreases, the illegal armed group’s income grows so the incentive
o negotiate decreases.
The dominant effect depends on the shape of the function F(·)
nd on the initial conditions.
If the income of legal agents is big, that is,
L > T + (C + T)/T(1/((C + T)FC(·) − F(·))), then by increasing C the
uerrillas reduce the possibility of a pre-donations scheme being
cceptable for both parties.
Consider the case where FCC(·) <0. When C is high the term
(C + T)/T)(1/((C + T)FC(·) − F(·))) is also high, so condition A is likely
o hold. In other words, by increasing C, guerrillas may  generate
onditions for a pre-donations scheme to be acceptable for both
arties.
Now, if under the initial conditions C is low, then by increasing
 guerrillas may  worsen the conditions for a pre-donations scheme
o be acceptable for both parties.
In other words, if the costs of conﬂict are consuming a big share
f the income of the legal agents then, by increasing their military
ower, illegal armed groups may  force the government to accept a
re-donations scheme and cease ﬁre.
These results suggest that war escalation may  be a dominant
trategy for the parties in order to increase the chances of a pre-
onations scheme being acceptable to them both.
The behavior of the FARC and the government during the peace
alks ﬁts into this logic. The FARC demanded demilitarization of
 region of Colombia, the removal of ofﬁcers from the military,
nd a crackdown on the paramilitaries while it was  substantially
ncreasing the number of guerrillas and its destructive power. The
overnment, with the approval of the Plan Colombia, reinforced the
ar against drugs and increased the strength of the army with the
dea that the guerrillas were major drug dealers so, by eliminating
rug trafﬁcking, the government would achieve two goals, the end
f illicit trafﬁc and a victory over the guerrillas..4. Other sources of income
As stated above, illegal groups often have income sources that
re illegal (coca and poppy crops) but are not directly related toEconomics 47 (2013) 105– 117
appropriative activities. This fact may  affect the parties’ incentives
and increase the complexity of the problem.
In general, the government is not interested in expropriating the
rebels’ income. However, in the outcome of N,N the government can
use its military power in order to reduce the income of the rebels.
We now introduce these issues in the original model. In order
to do so, we must ﬁrst deﬁne:
II0: Illegal armed groups’ initial income.
II1: Illegal armed groups’ income under confrontation.
: The share of Illegal armed groups’ income which effectively goes
to illegal groups when the government ﬁghts in order to reduce
the income of the rebels.
We  also assume that II1 > II0. In other words, we assume than
once the rebels are undertaking appropriative activities they get
involved in other illegal business in which proﬁtability is high.
Under these assumptions, the game with pre-donations is
described as follows,
Proposition 5. A system of pre-donations induces guerrilla
groups to cease ﬁre if the pre-donated amount is such that
 > 1 + ((II1 − II0 − C)/P0IL).
The guerrilla group is willing to cease ﬁre if the pre-donated
amount in the scenario CF,CF is bigger than the appropriated
amount plus the pre-donated amount in the scenario CF,N minus
the cost of belligerence. In other words the illegal armed group is
willing to cease ﬁre if  > (1 + (II1 − II0 − C)/P0IL).
Note that this condition is more restrictive than the analogous
condition in Proposition 1 because II1 > II0. Moreover, if II1 − II0 > C,
then there is no feasible pre-donations scheme ( < 1) that will be
acceptable for the rebels. However, this condition also implies that
the government may  use its military power in order to reduce the
income of the rebels and generate conditions for a pre-donations
scheme to be acceptable.25
The incentives of the legal agents are not affected by this
assumption so Proposition 2 is valid in this setting.
Proposition 6. If C−(II1−II0)(1−P1)P0 > IL − T then there is a feasible and
effective pre-donation mechanism.
Therefore, the success of a pre-donations system depends not
only on the costs of the conﬂict, C and T, and the income of legal
agents, IL, it also depends on the income that the rebels derive from
non-appropriative illegal activities.
Proposition 6 may  explain why  the FARC has not accepted
a peaceful settlement whereas other guerrilla groups did. While
other groups were not actively involved in drug production and
trafﬁcking activities, the FARC became involved after the demise
of the large drug cartels in the middle of the 1990s. In a sense,
if this explanation is correct, then the conﬂict between the FARC
and the Colombian government is more than a distributive con-
ﬂict. Similarly, Proposition 6 may  explain why  the Plan Colombia
had important effects on the balance of power.
4.5. Future RESEARCH
4.5.1. Military expenditure appropriated share and asymmetric
information in repeated games
So far, we  have modeled the problem as a one-shot game,be argued that the military conﬂict and the negotiation process are
25 The condition holds for low values of .
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CF IL(1 − ) II0 + IL
N  (IL − T)(1 − ) II0 + (IL − T) 
haracterized by consecutive actions and reactions. Additionally,
n a repeated game, the strategy of both players gives information
bout their actual perceptions so their strategies may  change with
ime as might the equilibrium in the game. Admittedly, in order to
pproach these problems in a formal way we would need a broader
heoretical framework.
The dynamics of the Colombia conﬂict and, in particular, the
ehavior of the FARC over the last decade may  be better understood
sing a dynamic setting in which perceptions are endogenous.
The breakup of negotiations with the FARC in 2001 added to
n atmosphere of insecurity, while the urgency of military actions
gainst guerrilla groups was the main topic of discussion during
he 2002 presidential campaign. President Uribe won  the 2002
lections on the basis of a military and security agenda against ille-
al armed groups. His agenda of so-called “democratic security”
ncluded stepping up military expenditure by means of a tax on
ealth (democratic security tax). This tax allowed the government
o ﬁnance the emergency plan (plan de choque), that is, the increase
n troops, special rapid deployment units, mountain-warfare bat-
alions and urban Special Forces. The Democratic Security strategy
ncreased military expenditure by 1.3 additional points, reach-
ng 5.7% of GDP in 2008. In addition, the number of troops
ncreased by 28% (these included anti-guerrilla troops as well as
olicemen sent to police outposts in isolated regions, to com-
lete the territorial presence of the armed forces all over the
ountry).
This military expenditure was followed by signiﬁcant changes
n statistics for kidnappings (from 3.572 in 2000 to 521 in 2007);
assacres (from 236 to 26 in 2007); attacks against pipelines and
errorist assaults against towns (from 1549 to 387 in 2007). In
ddition, armed forces operational results showed an increase in
mmunition, weaponry and communication equipment seized and
n rebels captured and killed. Also, demobilization of FARC rebels
ose by 460% from 2002 to 2008.26
Following the theoretical framework, increasing military expen-
iture can be expected to have an effect on the FARC’ armed
trategy. The FARC has been signiﬁcantly affected, moving from
ostly offensive actions to a movement back toward its strategic
ear guard. In fact, in 2013 the FARC decided to join the Colombian
overnment in La Habana negotiations.
.5.2. Heterogeneity within groups
Guerrilla groups are often heterogeneous. In particular, income
istribution may  be unequal in such groups. If this is the case,
 successful pre-donations system must take into account the
ifferences among members. If income is the only source of hetero-
eneity, a successful pre-donations scheme can be easily adapted
o make it acceptable for every single rebel.
If, however, there are more sources of hetererogeneity, the
roblem becomes more complicated. For instance, if the hierar-
hies and the distribution of power within groups are based on
ilitary skills then, after a peace agreement, some of the leaders
ould lose power. In this case, the incentives to negotiate are also
26 Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense Statistics (2008) on Results of armed
nd security force operations to counter terrorism, violence and crime. In:
ttp://www.mindefensa.gov.co/descargas2/anexos/2644 Avance de la Politica de
efensa y Seguridad ingles.pdf.IL(1 − P0L)(1 − ) (II1 − C) + P0LIL + IL(1 − P0L)
(IL − T)(1 − P1L)(1 − ) (II1 − C) + P1L(IL − T) + (IL − T)(1 − P1L)
heterogeneous and any effective pre-donations scheme would be
so complicated that it would be impossible to implement. Admit-
tedly, this is an important issue and the framework we  develop in
this paper is insufﬁcient to analyze this problem.
4.6. La Habana talks
The 2012 negotiation process between FARC and the Colombian
government seems to be producing unprecedented results. At the
conclusion of the ninth round of the La Habana talks, the parties
announced important progress in the negotiation process. After
more than six months, they had reached an agreement on land
and rural development. This was the ﬁrst time the government
and the FARC had ever agreed on a substantive topic. Addition-
ally, for the ﬁrst time ever, the FARC representatives admitted that
they shared responsibility for the suffering of the victims of the
Colombian conﬂict.
Many of the elements discussed in our theoretical framework
indicate that this time the negotiation process may  end with a
successful pre-donations scheme. First, public spending in defense
went from 3.6% to 6.1% of GDP from 1999 to 2007. Accordingly, the
relative strength of the FARC was  substantially reduced. Consis-
tent with equation (6), by enhancing investment the government
increases the costs of the conﬂict while the increase in military
expenditure reduces the appropriated share of illegal groups, so
it also creates incentives to negotiate for guerrilla groups. Second,
the government seems to be preparing the country for the post-
conﬂict. On the one hand, in 2011 the parliament passed the Law
of Victims and Land Restitution, deﬁning the process of returning
victims to their homes. On the other hand, the Legal Framework for
Peace incorporates transitional justice into the constitution, as part
of a potential peace agreement which brings an end to the armed
conﬂict. Even though guerrilla members expressed reservations
about the suitability of such laws, it seemed that the government
was determined to respect the agreements and fulﬁll its promises.
Third, the active participation of Venezuela as ‘communicator’ and
‘manipulator’ might be increasing changes in a successful pre-
donation scheme. This topic, however, deserves a detailed analysis
on its own  and therefore goes beyond the scope of the paper at
hand.
5. Conclusions
We study economic conﬂicts using game theory reasoning. We
model conﬂict between two  parties where each has two possible
strategies: cease-ﬁre or rejection of the truce. In this setting, we use
the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redeﬁnition of the game
in which agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the
other agent (Sertel, 1992). We  explain under which conditions a
system of pre-donations may  facilitate a truce. We  ﬁnd that for
conﬂicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism,
acceptable for both parties, making cease-ﬁre the best strategy for
both.
We also ﬁnd that different perceptions about the strength of the
parties reduce the possibilities of an agreement because the set of
acceptable pre-donations schemes is reduced. However, if the costs
of conﬂict represent a big share of the income of legal agents then,
by increasing their military power, illegal armed groups may  force
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he government to accept a pre-donations scheme and cease ﬁre.
imilarly, by increasing defense expenditure, the government may
hange the conditions of the game and increase the possibility of
 cease-ﬁre. Of course, the conditions of the post-conﬂict arrange-
ent would depend on the relative strength of the parties, that is,
y increasing their military power, the parties would also increase
heir bargaining power.
These results suggest that escalation of war may  be an optimal
trategy for the parties to increase the chances of a pre-donations
cheme being acceptable for them both.
We also show that the success of a pre-donations system also
epends on the income that rebels derive from non-appropriative
llegal activities. Our results may  explain why the FARC, heavily
nvolved in drug production, has not accepted a peaceful settlement
hereas other guerrilla groups did.
In general, we illustrate the relevance of the results described
ith historical episodes in the Colombian conﬂict. In particular, we
efer to the attempts at negotiation between the government and
he FARC, as well as talks and peace processes with M-19, EPL and
UC.
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